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"VOLUNTARY" ADMISSION OF CHILDREN TO MENTAL
HOSPITALS: A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD
[H]ospitalization in a mental institution is a serious and possibly
injurious event in the life of an individual, particularly a child or
adolescent. Institutionalized individuals are cut off from significant
interpersonal relationships with family and friends, and from their
usual life activities. Institutionalization creates a major discontinuity
in a person's life. It also places him or her within an artificial, regi-
mented and restrictive environment that can seriously harm those
not in need of such placement.'
Despite the gravity of the harm and the deprivation of liberty involved
in institutionalization, most states today allow parents to place their
child in a mental institution, with only the approval of a hospital admin-
istrator or psychiatrist required.2 The child is afforded no procedural
protections and, therefore, has no adequate opportunity to voice any objec-
1. Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger at 3, filed with Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Poe v. Weinberger,
Civil No. 74-1800 (three-judge court) (D.D.C., filed Aug. 28, 1975). Dr. Messinger
is the chief of the Child and Adolescent Out-Patient Department at Metropolitan
Hospital, a large municipal hospital in New York City. He has qualified as an expert
for the purpose of providing opinion evidence on the placement of juveniles in mental
institutions.
2. Maryland's statute permitting parents and guardians of minors to voluntarily
commit them to mental institutions is typical of those found in other states. Regarding
admissions to an institution for the mentally ill, MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 11(g)
(1972) provides:
(g) Persons under 18 years of age. - Any facility licensed by or under the juris-
diction of the Department may admit for the purposes of care or treatment, or
both, any person under the age of 18 years who has any mental disorder which is
susceptible of care or treatment and whose admission to such facility has been
requested by at least one parent or his legal guardian. The person requesting such
admission must, as a prerequisite to the admission, be able to understand the
nature of the request. The admission request must be formal, written and assented
to by an admitting physician at the facility. No person admitted pursuant to this
subsection may be retained for more than three days, after the person who re-
quested his admission requests his release, unless his admission status is changed
pursuant to § 12 of this subtitle. No person admitted pursuant to this subsection
may be retained by a facility for any period in excess of one year unless his
admission status has been changed after initial admission or unless at the expir-
ation of each one year period of inpatient residence a new request is executed by a
parent or the legal guardian of the patient.
MD. ANN. CODE art 59A, § 9 (Supp. 1975) covers admissions to an institution for the
mentally retarded.
For a listing of the other state statutes permitting parents to voluntarily
commit their children to mental institutions, see Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental
Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 840 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Ellis].
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tions he may have to institutionalization.3 Ironically, such admissions are
considered to be "voluntary. ' ' 4 In contrast, adults facing institutionaliza-
tion, i.e., civil commitment, are entitled to a full panoply of procedural
protections including a hearing, notice, right to be present at the hearing,
right to subpoena witnesses, and right to appointed counsel. 5
This disparity between the rights of adults and children has recently
been challenged in a number of lawsuits throughout the country.6 Bartley
v. Kremens7 is one of the few cases to have been decided on the merits
thus far ;8 it is presently on appeal to the United States Supreme
3. This statement reflects the present state of affairs in the majority of jurisdic-
tions. See note 11 infra for a delineation of the procedures implemented by the few
states that have deviated from this norm.
4. The term voluntary admission, when used in conjunction with adult mental
patients, i.e., those over the age of eighteen years, refers to patients who request
admission to the facility. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § lla (1972). However,
minors are not allowed to independently seek admission to a mental institution. Thus
the term "voluntary" admission when used in conjunction with minor mental patients
connotes parental request for admission and in no way reflects the child's attitude or
desires. In addition, adult voluntary patients may seek and obtain release at any
time, whereas a child is unable to seek release until he or she reaches the statutory
age of majority. The power to request a discharge lies solely with the parent.
5. See note 20 infra.
6. E.g., Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge
court), prob. juris. noted, 96 S. Ct. 1457 (1976); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112
(M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis.
1975) (preliminary injunction against parental commitment statutes); Poe v. Wein-
berger, Civil No. 74-1800 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 28, 1975) (stayed pending decision
in Bartley).
7. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court), prob. juris noted
96 S. Ct. 1457 (1976).
8. An almost identical case was recently decided by a three-judge court in
Georgia. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court).
The court held that the Georgia statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971), providing
for the voluntary admission of minor children to mental hospitals by parents or
guardians was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In describing the statute under review, the court stated:
Neither the statutory scheme nor the practices and policies utilized by the
defendants provide for any procedural safeguards. . . . [C]hildren are institu-
tionalized without a hearing or other procedural safeguards; are hospitalized with-
out initial or periodic consideration of placement in the least drastic environment
necessary for treatment; and are not afforded a hearing at any time for the deter-
mination of an appropriate required time for discharge.
In concept and practice the statute vests in parents and guardians ... and
in superintendents of state mental hospitals an unbridled discretion to admit and
detain emotionally disturbed children in Georgia's mental hospitals at least until
their 18th birthday.
412 F. Supp. at 136. The court then explained why parents and hospital superintendents
should not be given such unchecked power over essential liberties and how due process
would supply the necessary double check. Id. at 138-39. The Supreme Court has, how-
ever, granted a stay of the court's order and judgment. 96 S. Ct. 1503 (1976).
A similar issue was decided in Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974) (three-judge court). In that case, action was brought on behalf of
patients of a state hospital and school for the mentally retarded, alleging constitu-
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Court.9 Plaintiffs in Bartley filed a class action on behalf of the named plain-
tiffs and all persons eighteen years of age or younger who have been, are, or
may be admitted or committed to mental health facilities 10 in Pennsylvania
under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Retardation Act." Plaintiffs
contended that they were being denied due process and equal protection
because Pennsylvania allows plaintiffs and their class to be detained -
denied their liberty - in mental institutions without sufficient procedural
safeguards.' 2 The court concentrated on three basic questions: (1) Does
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment apply in this particular
case; (2) If so, can the procedural protections secured by that provision
be effectively waived by plaintiffs' parents, guardians ad litem, or persons
standing in loco parentis; (3) What procedural protections are involved.
tional violations in certain admission and operational practices. A three-judge court
held that the Tennessee statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-501 (Supp. 1975), permitting
a parent, guardian or person having legal custody of a mentally retarded minor (or
adult) to place the individual without restriction in the state hospital, did not comply
with constitutional due process requirements. The court issued an order enjoining
further hospital admissions pursuant to the provisions of the statute and requiring
adherence to the alternative provisions set out by the court. The due process pro-
cedures ordered by the court provide for the creation of an Admissions Review Board
authorized to conduct hearings. 404 F. Supp. at 438-40.
9. 96 S. Ct. 1457 (1976).
10. The court noted that the action concerned children who allegedly are mentally
ill as well as children who are allegedly mentally retarded. 402 F. Supp. at 1041.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4402-03 (1969). At the time the suit was filed,
these statutory provisions were similar to the ones set out in note 2 supra. However,
after plaintiffs filed the action, the Department of Public Welfare, pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 4201(2) (1969), adopted additional procedural safeguards for children
admitted or committed to institutions pursuant to the sections in question. The new
regulations, set out in the court's opinion, permit a hearing for those juveniles thir-
teen and older but do not provide a time by which such a commitment hearing must
be held. "With respect to children twelve years of age or younger, there is no re-
quirement for a hearing, no less a designated time." 402 F. Supp. at 1042-43 n.5.
Thus, Pennsylvania is now among the few states with provisions for procedures
differing from the traditional "voluntary" admission procedure. Other states have
deviated from the norm in various ways. Connecticut has interpreted its statute, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187 (1975), as providing hearing rights to children. Melville
v. Sabbotino, 30 Conn. Supp. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (1973). Illinois, in the case of In re
Lee, No. 68 (JD) 1362 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Juv. Div., Ill. 1972), interpreted its
statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91% § 5-1 (1969), to permit minors to seek their own
release without prior parental approval. Texas requires consent of the child prior
to "voluntary" admission by the parent, although the required consent apparently need
not be in writing. TEX. ANN. STAT. art. 5547-23 (1958). Mississippi and South
Dakota apparently have no statutory provision for any voluntary commitment to
mental hospitals. Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island and North
Carolina make no distinction in their statutes concerning differing age groups. How-
ever a North Carolina court recently held that children are entitled to due process
procedures in mental commitment proceedings. In re Long, 25 N.C. App. 702, 214
S.E.2d 626 (1975).
12. 402 F. Supp. at 1042. Similar allegations were made in the other cases filed,
see note 6 supra.
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The court concluded that the due process clause applies to children
facing institutionalization ;13 that parents or guardians cannot waive the
procedural protections afforded children by virtue of that clause ;14 and
that the process due a child includes: a hearing within seventy-two hours
from the date of initial detention to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe institutionalization is necessary; a post-commitment hear-
ing within two weeks from the date of initial detention; written notice,
including the date, time, and place of the hearing, and a statement of the
grounds for the proposed commitment; the right to counsel at all signifi-
cant stages of the commitment process and if indigent the right to appoint-
ment of free counsel; the right to be present at all hearings concerning
the proposed commitment; a requirement that the court find by clear and
convincing proof that the child is in need of institutionalization; and, the
right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses against him, to offer
evidence in his own behalf, and to offer testimony of witnesses. 15
The three-judge court entered a declaratory and injunctive order
implementing its judgment. The court ordered the defendants to refrain
from accepting or continuing the admission or commitment to mental
institutions of any class member unless the specified constitutional protec-
tions are provided so as to minimize the possibility of erroneous commit-
ment and to avoid the stigma and deprivation of institutionalization. 16
The court further ordered the defendants to initiate procedures, com-
mencing immediately, to ensure that all class members presently committed
under the challenged statute are either discharged, released or recommitted
according to the procedures required by the opinion.' 7  However, the
court's order has been stayed by the United States Supreme Court.'8
The emphasis in defendant's application for a stay was on alleged juris-
dictional errors. 19 Although the Supreme Court may focus on these pro-
cedural problems, the substantive decision seems unlikely to escape eventual
review.
13. 402 F. Supp. at 1945-47.
14. Id. at 1047-48.
15. Id. at 1053.
16. Slip order at 6-7 (Nov. 17, 1975).
17. Id. at 8.
18. 96 S. Ct. 558 (1975). Defendants first petitioned the three-judge court for a
stay, but it was unanimously denied. They then petitioned Mr. Justice Brennan, in his
capacity as Circuit Justice, and he also denied the stay. The application was resub-
mitted to Mr. Justice Rehnquist and by him referred to the entire court. The stay was
subsequently granted.
19. Defendants, citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), maintain that
the lower court erred in hearing the case because habeas corpus, rather than a civil
rights action, is the proper remedy to be used in challenging the legality of one's con-
finement. By entertaining plaintiffs' challenge to the fact of their confinement within
the context of a civil rights action, the court, it is argued, did not require exhaustion
of state remedies. In addition, defendants charge that the lower courts' action in
Bartley constitutes improper judicial legislation. Defendants also challenge the pro-
priety of retroactive relief. Defendants' Application For A Stay at 3-6 (Dec. 8, 1975).
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The Bartley court's conclusion that persons committed to mental insti-
tutions were being denied liberty and were thereby entitled to due process
is novel only to the extent that it is applied to children. It is virtually
beyond dispute that the state may not commit adults to mental institutions
without affording them substantial procedural safeguards.20 The decision
in Bartley evinced a realization that the child, as well as the adult, who
faces the possibility of being physically confined for an indeterminate period,
clearly has an interest within the contemplation of the language of the
fourteenth amendment. 2' In determining what safeguards were necessary
to protect this interest, the court considered each procedural right of which
20. Chief Justice Burger recently stated, "Commitment must be justified on the
basis of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a particular in-
dividual must be established in an appropriate proceeding." O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (concurring opinion). In other cases, the Supreme Court
has consistently recognized that commitment proceedings, whether denominated civil
or criminal, must comport with due process. See McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245(1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504(1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966).
The lower federal courts have uniformly upheld the application of due process to
adult mental commitments, mandating procedures similar or identical to those required
by the district court in Bartley. See, e.g., Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (1st
Cir. 1973); In re Ballay, 483 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d
1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); In re
Basso, 299 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D.
Hawaii 1976); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court); Bell v. Wayne County,
384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) ; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974), judgment reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975) [for purposes of this Comment, only
the original lower court decision will hereinafter be cited]; Dixon v. Attorney
General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). For a comprehensive review of the
state of the law of civil commitment as it relates to adults, see Developments in the
Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally I1, 87 HARv. L REv. 1190 (1974).
21. The court stated, "The particular question here is whether or not a child's
interest in not being institutionalized . . . is safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 402 F. Supp. 1046. The court had little trouble answering this question in
the affirmative. Id. at 1046-47. The three-judge court in J.L. v. Parham, 412 F.
Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), also discussed the child's liberty interest:
[Tihis case raises the most important question of every child's constitutional right
to liberty, not only the liberty that includes freedom from bodily restraint, ...
but also the liberty that includes the freedom of an ordinary, every-day child in
these United States of America ....
To unnecessarily confine and detain a child in a mental hospital . . . is to
deprive him of a child's freedom just as much if not more so than a child is
deprived of his freedom by being civilly committed as a juvenile delinquent. ...
"In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require
the procedural regularity ... implied in the phrase 'due process'" . . . for children




the plaintiffs were allegedly deprived, weighing as to each the competing
interests of plaintiffs and the state.22
The court, in addition to deciding that due process applied and what
process was due, considered the "difficult and unique" 23 question of whether
parents, guardians ad litem, or persons standing in loco parentis may
effectively waive the personal rights of children.24 The crux of this ques-
tion is a confrontation between the liberty interest of the child and "the
consistently recognized authority of parents to direct the rearing of their
children." 25 Both interests, the child's and the parents', are constitutionally
protected.26 The court in Bartley, seemingly as a prophylactic measure,27
22. Plaintiffs' interest is in being free from the wrongful and unwarranted de-
privation of their liberty. The state's interests are threefold. It has an interest in "the
mental health of children (parens patriae), an interest in preserving the family unit
and maintaining parental authority over children, and an interest in confining, for the
protection of society, those persons who pose significant danger to the community
(police power)." 402 F. Supp. at 1048.
Other federal courts have struck similar balances in upholding the applica-
tion of various due process protections in the context of adult civil commitment. See
note 20 supra. For a discussion of the propriety of the procedures mandated, see
Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 20, at
1271-1316.
23. 402 F. Supp. at 1047.
24. The same question dominates several of the pending suits; see, e.g., Poe v.
Weinberger, Civil No. 74-1800 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 28, 1975), "The sole question
in the instant case is whether juveniles may have the foregoing procedural safeguards
waived for them by their parents or guardians." Memorandum in Support of Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alterniative for Summary Judgment, at 3.
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue. While the Court
has repeatedly required that a juvenile's constitutional rights be protected from in-
fringement, previous cases presented situations where the interests of the parents were
allegedly aligned with those of the juvenile against the State. A contrary situation is
presented by Bartley where the interests of parent and child are in conflict. See notes
144-52 and accompanying text infra. However, there are a few older Supreme Court
cases, noted in Plaintiffs' Motion to Affirm (filed in the Supreme Court, Feb. 23,
1976), which can be read to imply that parents and guardians cannot act to waive or
prejudice the rights of their children or wards. See O'Hara v. MacConnell, 93 U.S.
150 (1876) (court must assure that minor has independent representation in proceed-
ing to deprive her of property; notice and opportunity to be heard required) ; Hoyt v.
Hammekin, 55 U.S. 346, 351 (1852) (a guardian cannot dispose of the property of his
ward without the permission of the judge of his domicile) ; Bank of the United States
v. Ritchie, 33 U.S. 128 (1834) (minor's guardian cannot consent, absent hearing and
proof before a court, to the relief sought in a proceeding against the child).
25. 402 F. Supp. at 1047.
26. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (parents' interest in direct-
ing upbringing of their children constitutionally protected); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (child's liberty interest constitutionally protected).
27. The court stated:
[If we could find that in all instances parents act in the best interest of their
children, we might also find that parents may waive constitutional rights of their
children. Unfortunately, as such a graphic example as parental child abuse illus-
trates, this is not the case. In deciding to institutionalize their children, parents,
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resolved the conflict of interests in favor of the child's liberty. 28 The
propriety of this resolution will be the focus of this Comment.
THE SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD
The state legislatures, in enacting "voluntary" admissions statutes
for minors, did not necessarily anticipate a conflict of interest between
parent and child. Rather, it seems that a number of assumptions were
made about the role of parents and hospital administrators in the admis-
sion process and about the nature of hospitalization itself. 29 The assump-
tions can be summarized as follows: (1) Parents3" act in the best interests
of their child and therefore there is an identity of interest between the
child and the parent seeking his hospitalization; (2) Even if parents
might seek hospitalization in inappropriate circumstances, admitting physi-
cians at mental health facilities would be able to identify such cases and
block their admission; (3) Since institutionalization is wholesome and
therapeutic, the admission procedure is infused with a benign purpose
which obviates the need for commonly accepted safeguards.31 These sup-
positions are best evaluated seriatim.
as well as guardians ad litem or persons standing in loco parentis, may at times
be acting against the interests of their children. With this in mind, we must agree
with Judge Judd in New York State Association for Retarded Children, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), that in the absence of evidence that the child's
interests have been fully considered, parents may not effectively waive personal
constitutional rights of their children.
402 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
28. This resolution can also be viewed as an accommodation of both interests as
opposed to a valuation of one above the other. See Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, at 3, Poe v. Weinberger,
Civil No. 74-1800 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 28, 1975).
Under D.C. Code §§ 21-511 and 512 which provide for the "voluntary" commit-
ment of juveniles by their parents, parental control is maintained at the total
expense of the juvenile's liberty interest. In contrast, providing a juvenile with
the full panoply of procedural protections before commitment would protect the
juvenile from wrongful incarceration without undermining legitimate parental in-
terests. For the real parental interest at stake is not custody and control for their
own sake, but rather for the purpose of assuring that the child receives appro-
priate and needed treatment.
29. The Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (Public Health
Service Publication No. 51, 1951) promulgated by the National Institute of Mental
Health encouraged "voluntary" admission of children by their parents and most states
adopted such provisions. Although legislative history is scarce, writers and litigators
in the mental health field have suggested several basic premises which appear to have
provided support for the legislation. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
30. References will be to "parents" only, however, what is said applies equally to
guardians or persons standing in loco parentis.
31. Petitioner's Trial Brief at 4, Cox v. Godsey, No. A-4662 (Ch. Ct., pt. II,
Davidson County, Tenn., Dec. 19, 1974) (case challenging Tennessee's voluntary
admission statute, settled out and a two page consent decree issued.) See Ellis, supra
note 2, at 850-68.
1976]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Parents seek institutionalization of their children for a variety of
reasons, some of which do not reflect the child's best interests.3 2 Some
parents may try to shift the responsibility for their own, or for shared
derelictions to their children.33 This particular problem was recognized
by the court in In re Sippy,34 when it refused to place a child in a
psychiatric facility after the mother conceded that she herself had a strong
temper, had never been able to evaluate her own problems, and had diffi-
culty avoiding clashes with her daughter. There is also a tendency for
parents to seek hospitalization for their child in response to the pressures
of familial dysfunction in general. Recognition of this tendency is reflected
in the present trend of mental health professionals who are increasingly
turning to treatment of the family unit as a more realistic subject of therapy
than the individual members themselves.3 5 Parental misperception of mental
illness is another factor influencing decisions to commit ;38 and even chance
may play a considerable role.
In a crisis situation, parents may go to the first facility about
which they are told or to whatever facility is closest. Lacking
knowledge of other facilities and alternatives, the family may see
hospital care as the only approach to the crisis. For poor families,
dependent upon public institutions, this problem is compounded by
a more limited number of resources from which to choose.3 7
Many societal pressures operate to induce parents to institutionalize
a mentally retarded child. These pressures include uninformed medical
opinions and the parents' own success-oriented expectations of their
32. The court in J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-
judge court) noted:
Most parents accept and faithfully perform their parental duties and given this
unlimited statutory authority to admit their children to a mental hospital, would
use that authority only when it is genuinely necessary to do so. Unfortunately, as
the evidence indicates, there are some parents who abuse that authority and who
under the guise of admitting a child to a mental hospital actually abandon their
child to the state. As Dr. Filley suggested in his deposition, some still look upon
mental hospitals as a "dumping ground."
33. Vogel & Bell, The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat, in
A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 412-27 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds. rev. ed.
1968); Ellis, supra note 2, at 859-60; see J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga.
1976) (three-judge court).
34. 97 A.2d 455, 459 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953) (proceeding by mother to have
her daughter committed to psychiatric school on ground that daughter was habitually
beyond mother's control).
35. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, TREATMENT OF FAMILIES
IN CONFLICT (1970); N. ACKERMAN, TREATING THE TROUBLED FAMILY (1966); T.
LIDZ, S. FLECK AND A. CORNELLISON, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY (1965).
36. See note 80 infra.
37. Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 9; Ellis, supra note 2,
at 851-52.
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children.38 A number of courts have recognized the possibility of ques-
tionable parental motives in the realm of mental retardation. In Horacek
v. Exon,39 Judge Urbom stated: "I cannot be insensitive to the possibility
that the interests of the parents may conflict with those of the children
residing at the Beatrice State Home. While the parents in all good
conscience may desire one remedy, or a specific type or style of treatment
for their children, it would not necessarily be in the best interest of the
children." The court in New York Association for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller 40 made a similar observation;
There may be a fundamental conflict of interest between a parent
who is ready to avoid the responsibility of caring for an abnormal
child, and the best interests of the child. A "voluntary admission"
on the petition of parents may quite properly be treated in the same
category as an "involuntary admission" in the absence of evidence
that the child's interests have been fully considered.41
It is thus apparent that there is sufficient professional and judicial recog-
nition of the potential conflict of interest to refute the assumption that
parent and child always have a compatible interest in the child's in-
stitutionalization.
38. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded - Some Critical Issues, 7
FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 (1973). See note 80 infra. The court in Bartley identified several of
these pressures:
Patient number 13,212, an educable mongoloid boy with the capacity to participate
in many educable and trainable activities and who can be helped by an active
special elementary program in public schools, was institutionalized in Polk State
Hospital for a one-to-two-week period so that the other members of his family
could go on a family vacation. Patient number 288, a mentally retarded child,
was placed in Western State Hospital because of a poor family situation. The
mother of the child did not get along well with the child, and the family was
afraid that she would have another nervous breakdown if the child were not
placed in Western State Hospital. Patient number 281, a mentally retarded child,
was placed in a state institution because she had become a management problem
to both her parents and the community. Patient number 15, a mentally retarded
child, was placed in Western State Hospital because the child interfered with
the routine of the household and disturbed family members. The placement was
based on a fear that if the child remained in his home, the mother might break
down, the marriage of the child's parents might end in separation, the father's
health might fail, and an adolescent daughter might be pushed into a premature
marriage to escape an unhappy home.
402 F. Supp. at 1044.
39. 357 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Neb. 1973). Plaintiffs, represented through their
parents, brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), on behalf
of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, alleging that the physical con-
ditions, care, treatment, and training provided by the defendants at the Beatrice State
Home for the mentally retarded did not meet constitutional standards.
40. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The action was brought on behalf of
residents of a New York institution for the mentally retarded against certain New
York officials for equitable relief relating to the treatment and care of residents.
41. Id. at 762 (citations omitted). Accord, Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393,
396 (10th Cir. 1968); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
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Most voluntary admissions statutes require the approval of the ad-
mitting psychiatrist at the facility in order to complete the commitment
process.12 This commitment process, however, contains several basic prob-
lems which make it virtually impossible for the psychiatrist to serve as
an effective check on inappropriate parental efforts to institutionalize
their child.43 The screening interviews are very often short and perfunc-
tory,44 and the child may be hesitant to reveal much information about
himself in this setting. The quality of the information obtained from the
child tends to depend upon the psychiatrist first securing the child's trust
and confidence, which he is unlikely to do in the context of a "voluntary"
admissions interview. 45 Psychiatrists' tendency toward overdiagnosis is
another problem,46 as is the absence of any concrete or consistent standards
against which the physician's findings are to be measured. One psychiatrist
may feel that only persons who are gravely disabled should be institu-
tionized for long-term care in a state mental hospital, while another may
focus upon the person's dangerousness to others or to himself.4 7 An even
42. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 11(a) (1972), which provides, "The
admission request must be formal, written and assented to by an admitting physician
at the facility."
43. NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE "VOLUNTARY" ADMISSION OF CHILDREN TO MENTAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 54-62 (available through National Clearinghouse for Legal Services) [here-
inafter cited as LEGAL CHALLENGES].
44. Ellis, supra note 2, at 864. Ellis cites inadequate professional staffing and
lack of funds to conduct detailed investigations of the family background as reasons
for the poor quality of pre-commitment psychiatric investigations.
45. Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 10. Dr. Messinger
there states:
Under the present system of volunteering juveniles into mental hospitals, it is
not clear to whom the psychiatrist owes a duty. The parent is requesting place-
ment, but the juvenile is the one being hospitalized. Placed between parent and
child, the psychiatrist comes to be viewed as both doctor and jailor. This under-
mines his or her credibility during the interview, and consequently limits the type
and quality of information received.
46. See T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 105-21
(1966); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 720-23 (1974). Dr. Messinger also
commented on this phenomenon:
Psychiatrists have a tendency to recommend hospitalization when in doubt. By
erring on the side of admission rather than out-patient treatment, a psychiatrist
does not have to justify his actions to the party requesting hospitalization of the
juvenile, and does not have to fear that he or she will be held responsible if some-
thing should happen to the juvenile after hospitalization has been denied. These
practical considerations provide a subtle but strong bureaucratic pressure for the
psychiatrist to decide for hospitalization where doubts may exist.
Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 11.
47. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 rL8(M.D. Ala. 1974):
Not only is mental illness an elusive concept to define and difficult to diagnose
with precision, but the need for confinement in a given case is a determination
about which psychiatrists often disagree. One explanation for this is that psychia-
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more basic problem is presented by the fact that psychiatric judgments,
because of the nature of the science, are often unreliable. 48  In addition,
psychiatrists confronted with a "voluntary" admission are likely to accede
to the parents' wishes,4 19 which further destroys the validity of their
assessment. The court in In re Long5" recognized the existence of these
various problems:
At the initial examination there may be an understandable tendency
to over-diagnose. In other words, a psychiatrist may be predisposed
to find illness rather than health at the first examination on the as-
sumption that it is better to err on the side of caution. Also, where
a parent commits a child for treatment, the examining doctor may
quite naturally identify with the interest of the parent. If either of
these happens, the doctor would be unable to act effectively as a
screening agent at the initial stage of examination.
trists, like most other people, have wide differences of opinion about which sorts
of dangers justify incarceration and which do not.
The court in J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 134 (M.D. Ga. 1976), noted
that "In practice the language 'evidence of mental illness and to be suitable for treat-
ment' is as indefinite and elusive to the psychiatrists employed by the state as it is to
a layman." The court proceeded to quote the portion of the deposition of Dr. John
P. Filley, Director, Child and Mental Health Services, which discussed this problem.
48. See Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379
(1973); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 46, at 698-708 (1974). The court in J.L. v.
Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court) relied on this fact
in its response to the state's argument that children are constitutionally protected by
the independent judgment exercised by superintendents of the state's mental hospitals.
The court stated:
[P]sychiatrists like all humans are capable of erring. Since they are capable of
erring, psychiatrists like parents cannot statutorily be given the power to confine
a child in a mental hospital without procedural safeguards being imposed to guard
against errors in judgment and/or the arbitrariness that the best of us humans
exhibit frorri time to time.
Id. at 138.
49. LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 43, at 61-62; Ellis, supra note 2, at 867-68.
Ellis states:
While the goal of the psychiatrist will be expressed - and perceived - as the best
welfare of the child-patient, it is the parent who has come to seek help, whose
situation seems most desperate, who seems the most reliable source of informa-
tion about what is wrong, who is closest to the psychiatrist in age and social out-
look, and who is paying the psychiatrist's fee.
Ellis at 868. See also Roth & Lerner, Sex Based Discrimination in the Mental Insti-
tutionalization of Women, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 789, 801 (1974) ; "[W] hen family conflict
is a factor in the commitment decision, disagreements tend to be resolved in favor of
the person in the superior economic status position."
50. 25 N.C. App. 802, 214 S.E.2d 626, 629 (1975). Long involved a habeas corpus
action brought by a minor. The court held that a minor was entitled to due process
protection with respect to confinement in a state mental health facility. The court
ordered the minor petitioner released.
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Other courts have also evidenced an awareness of the unreliability
of psychiatric opinion.5 1 One indication of this is the trend in commit-
ment proceedings toward requiring establishment of the need for hospitali-
zation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.52 This trend can be interpreted
to reflect possible misgivings about the accuracy of psychiatric testimony
which usually determines the outcome of such proceedings. Apparently
for the same reason, a three-judge federal court in Pennsylvania, in Dixon
v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania,5 3 declared unconstitutional a statute
allowing commitment of an individual upon the certification by two doctors
that they had found the person to be mentally ill. It was thus found that
a psychiatrist's decision to commit a person was an inadequate substitute
for the procedural protections required by due process. In light of these
various judicial pronouncements and observations by mental health pro-
fessionals, the belief that admitting psychiatrists serve as an effective
check on misguided parental efforts to institutionalize their children is no
longer justified.
The third belief under which legislators apparently operated when
they devised "voluntary" admission statutes for minors concerns the nature
of hospitalization itself. Mental hospitals seem to have been envisioned
much the same as regular medical hospitals, as facilities in which a child
could receive treatment for a particular illness. On the contrary, the
51. The California Supreme Court recently stated:
In light of recent studies it is no longer heresy to question the reliability of
psychiatric predictions. Psychiatrists themselves would be the first to admit that
however desirable an infallible crystal ball might be, it is not among the tools
of their profession. It must be conceded that psychiatrists still experience con-
siderable difficulty in confidently and accurately diagnosing mental illness.
People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 325-26, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501, 535 P.2d 352, 365
(1975) (proper standard of proof in mentally disordered sex offender proceedings is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
52. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352 (1975); State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315,
204 N.W.2d 13 (1973); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
It is interesting to note the Bartley court's conclusion that the fact finder in a hearing
on commitment of a child as mentally ill or mentally retarded must apply the standard
of clear and convincing proof as opposed to standards of beyond a reasonable doubt
or preponderance of the evidence. The court explained its decision stating:
Applying a preponderance standard creates too great a risk of erroneous com-
mitment, wrongfully depriving a child of his interest in liberty, an interest of
'transcending value,' and, given the subjectivity and 'relatively undeveloped state
of psychiatry as a predictive science,' requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
creates too great a risk of erroneously releasing children in need of institu-
tionalization.
402 F. Supp. 1052-53 (footnotes omitted).
53. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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therapeutic value of institutionalization, especially with regard to children,
is thought to be highly questionable. 54
It is important to remember that hospitalization should not necessarily
be equated with psychiatric treatment. In large hospitals, the limited
time of psychiatrists is normally spent on admission procedures, routine
management and administrative matters leaving little time for thera-
peutic discussion with patients about their problems. Thus patients
who need intensive psychiatric counseling ironically have less chance
of receiving it inside rather than outside of a hospital.55
Absence of treatment is not by any means the only problematic charac-
teristic of mental hospitals; though there may be little or no positive action
taken, the child is being bombarded by negative experiences. He or she is
cut off from the outside world and subjected to very rigid and restrictive
social control, including a loss of privacy.56 This deprivation of liberty
has a number of detrimental consequences. The institutionalization itself
may induce aberrant behavior.5 7 The child in essence may learn to be
mentally ill. The personality changes resulting from confinement have been
described as "institutional neurosis", a "man-made disease" characterized
by:
apathy, lack of initiative, loss of interest more marked in things and
events not immediately personal or present, submissiveness, and some-
times no expression of feelings of resentment at harsh or unfair orders.
There is also a lack of interest in the future and an apparent in-
ability to make practical plans for it, a deterioration in personal
habits, toilet, and standards generally, a loss of individuality, and a
resigned acceptance that things will go on as they are - unchangingly,
inevitably, and indefinitely.58
54. E.g., Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 936,
939-48 (1974); Levitt, Psychotherapy with Children: A Further Evaluation, 1 BEH.
REs. & THERAPY 45, 49 (1963).
55. Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 3. An example of the
limited extent of interaction between doctor and patient was illuminated at the trial
of the now landmark case. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Evidence
was introduced to show that Donaldson had little contact with staff psychiatrists. He
saw his first doctor six times in eighteen months for a total of less than one hour and
his second doctor (who succeeded Donaldson's first physician) for at most two hours
over an eight and one-half year period. 493 F.2d 507, 514 (1974).
56. See E. Goffman, On the Characteristics of Total Institutions in ASYLUMS 1
(1961). Goffman is a sociologist, and this study is based in large part on his year of
field work at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. His objective during
that year was to learn about the social world of the hospital inmate as this world is
subjectively experienced by the inmate. To that end, he spent most of his days with the
patients and although he did not actually allow himself to be committed, he was quite
successful in involving himself in the daily routine to which patients were subjected.
57. Ellis, supra note 2, at 869.
58. D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CAREER 142 (1966)
quoting from R. BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (1959) [hereinafter cited as
VAIL]. The factors commonly found in the environment which are associated with
these characteristics include: 1) loss of contact with the outside world; 2) enforced
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To a child, the premium placed on compliance, conformity and passivity59
is exceptionally harmful. Juveniles need to establish a sense of initiative
and to develop self-respect and self-confidence.60 Hospital routine is inimi-
cal to these needs, stifling any sense of individuality or personal responsi-
bility. Other negative aspects of institutionalization include lack of peer
group interaction and constant exposure to chronic mental illness.61 In
addition, psychoactive drugs are used extensively both for medical and ad-
ministrative purposes62 despite the fact that these drugs have dangerous side
effects and that great caution should be used in their administration. 63 The
adverse consequences of institutionalization continue upon the individual's
release. Not only is the child likely to have a difficult time adjusting to
everyday life, but in addition, he or she must contend with the negative
labeling that tends to follow institutionalization.64 Again, the courts have
not been oblivious to these very serious problems. In the case of In re
Ballay65 the court stated that "institutionalization may have devastating side
effects upon those committed, particularly where they were not initially
in need of treatment." The court in Lessard v. Schmidt66 elaborated on
this theme:
In addition to the statutory disabilities associated with an adjudication
of mental illness, and just as serious, are the difficulties that the
committed individual will face in attempting to adjust to life outside
the institution following release. The stigma which accompanies any
hospitalization for mental illness has been brought to public attention in
the news stories surrounding the recent resignation of a vice-presiden-
tial aspirant from further candidacy. Evidence is plentiful that a
idleness; 3) bossiness of medical and nursing staff; 4) loss of personal friends,
possessions and personal events; 5) drugs; 6) ward atmosphere; 7) loss of property
outside the institution. VAIL at 143-44.
59. Goffman gives some indication of this premium in his explanation of the
routine admissions procedures in mental hospitals:
Admission procedures might better be called 'trimming' or 'programming' because
in thus being squared away the new arrival allows himself to be shaped and
coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the
establishment, to be worked on smoothly by routine operations.
GOFFMAN, supra note 56, at 16.
60. Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 4.
61. Id. The latter most often occurs when juveniles are placed on adult wards.
62. The main administrative purpose is to facilitate smooth operation of the ward.
63. Hearings on the Abuse and Misuse of Drugs in Institutions Before the Sub-
comm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (testimony of Gail Marker, M.S.W., of the Mental Health Law
Project, July 31, 1975).
64. Ellis, supra note 2, at 870. Ellis points out that the labels not only can affect
other people's perceptions of the individual but also can have a powerful impact on the
self concept of the person institutionalized.
65. 483 F.2d 648, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (appeal from commitment order).
66. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge federal court struck
down Wisconsin's civil commitment statute on the grounds that prospective patients
were denied due process).
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former mental patient will encounter serious obstacles in attempting
to find a job, sign a lease or buy a house.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Matthews v. Hardy7
found that "a person mistakenly placed in a mental hospital might suffer
severe emotional and psychic harm," and that such an individual "may not
be mentally ill at all. Yet ... he will be exposed to physical, emotional,
and general mental agony. Confined with those who are insane, told re-
peatedly that he too is insane and indeed treated as insane, it does not
take much for a man to question his own sanity and in the end to succomb
to some mental aberration .... "68
With these revelations concerning the detrimental and anti-therapeutic
nature of mental institutions, the third and final assumption regarding
institutionalization of children is amply refuted. Stripping away these pre-
sumptions has quite definitely exposed a conflict of interest between parent
and child. It is this conflict which the court in Bartley dealt with through
the provision of specific due process protections.
ANALOGOUS PARENT - CHILD CONFLICTS
With the conflict thus identified, it is useful to consider analogous areas
of the law where similar confrontations between the rights of parents and
children have been encountered. These areas include consent to medical
treatment, parental tort immunity, child abuse and neglect, and ungovern-
ability.69 The reconciliations of conflicting interests reached in these
various areas support the propriety of the Bartley resolution.
Consent to Medical Treatment
The responsibility and power of the parent in deciding to institu-
tionalize a child for mental health care is closely paralleled by that afforded
the parent in the area of physical health by virtue of the parental consent
doctrine. This common law doctrine, requiring either express or implied
consent of the parent to authorize medical treatment of a minor,70 evolved
from the belief that a minor is incapable of making intelligent decisions
regarding medical treatment and therefore, the child's parents must have
the authority to give or withhold consent in the child's behalf. 71 The
requirement of consent is thus perceived as a means of protecting and
67. 420 F.2d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (action brought by prisoner challenging
his transfer to a mental hospital).
68. Id., quoting from United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herald, 410 F.2d 1071,
1078 (2d Cir. 1969).
69. Additional relevant areas not covered in this Comment include adoption and
custody. For discussion of the latter, see Ellis, supra note 2, at 879-80; Levin,
Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court, 34 MD. L. Rv. 341 (1974).
70. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
71. See Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental
Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305, 309 (1974).
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helping the minor, the same laudable objectives presumptively underlying
the present voluntary admissions procedures for minors.
Giving parents the right to make legally binding decisions in regard to
the health needs of their children (both physical and mental) does not,
in and of itself, insure protection of the minor. Only if parents are capable
of perceiving the child's needs and are willing to meet them will the
child actually benefit. 72 Acknowledgement of this underlying corollary has
given rise to increased recognition of the independent rights of children
in situations where parents and children are likely to have conflicting
interests. One example of such a conflict is apparent when parents with-
hold consent despite an obvious need for medical attention on the part
of the minor.78  "This type of case is important because the conceptual
conflict between the parents' power of decision regarding the physical
integrity of their child and the detached, objective assessment of what is
in the best interests of the child comes into sharp focus."'7 4 The classic
case of this nature is that of the parents who, because of adherence to
particular religious or philosophic beliefs, refuse to consent to a blood
transfusion or other medical treatment necessary to preserve or maintain
their child's health.75
In this realm, the state, exercising its parens patriae power,76 is often
willing to intervene in the decision making process in order to preserve
"the best interests of the child.""7 In many instances, judicial proceedings
are initiated under the state neglect statute in order to justify court order
72. See Wilkins, Children's Rights: Removing the Parental Consent Barrier to
Medical Treatment of Minors, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 31, 34-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Wilkins]. This fact is reflected in the assertion made by counsel in Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Response to Petitioner's Return, at 11, In re Paul J.B.,
1 Grim. 14811 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., filed Dec. 30, 1975):
Most parents are not themselves trained in the diagnosis or treatment of
mental illness. Although their observations and information concerning their
children would be invaluable in determining whether a child should be placed in
a mental hospital, there is no reason to suppose that the average parent possesses
the expertise essential to making the ultimate decision. That the parent is con-
cerned and knowledgeable about his own child does not impute to him knowledge
regarding the adolescent program at Napa State Hospital.
73. Wilkins, supra note 72, at 47-49, 55-56.
74. Id. at 47.
75. E.g., In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 685, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970),
aff'd 37 App. Div. 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86,
185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Lucas County Dom. Rel. Div. 1962); In re Seiferth, 309
N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
76. Under the parens patriae doctrine the state has a duty to protect all citizens
who cannot protect themselves. This duty encompasses protection of infants from their
parents and others who may harm them. Thus, while parents are afforded maximum
latitude in child rearing, there is no immunity from state interference should circum-
stances require it. For a discussion of the historical development and impact of the
parens patriae doctrine, see Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the
Constitutional Limits of the Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PIr. L. REv. 894 (1966).
77. See, e.g., In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Iowa 1972).
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of medical treatment over parental objection.78  Comparing state inter-
vention in medical treatment cases to the admission procedures for
children in mental institutions, James W. Ellis of the Mental Health Law
Project stated:
The parens patriae doctrine allows courts to adjust the parent-child
relationship in order to prevent harm to the child. Parens patriae
should, at a minimum, permit courts to review parental discretion in
commitment cases where wrongful and unnecessary confinement may
also prove very damaging to the child.79
Another similarity indicative of the need for state intervention via court
review lies in the fact that, just as personal convictions of the parents
influence their decision to consent to medical treatment, so too do personal
convictions influence their decision to institutionalize their child. 0 In the
context of medical treatment the courts have agreed to adopt a balancing
approach, weighing the relative importance of the prescribed treatment on
one hand and the reasonableness of the parents' objections on the other.8 1
Thus there should be no basis for prohibiting judicial scrutiny in the
voluntary admissions area where parental beliefs are similarly being im-
plemented at the possible expense of the child. Such scrutiny in both
situations should be viewed as a means of facilitating objective decision-
making during a potentially emotional period for both parent and child.
Another parent-child conflict concerning medical procedures has arisen
in regard to abortion procural. In these cases, it is not judicial intervention
which is sought but rather the personal right of a pregnant minor to con-
sent to or to refuse an abortion. 2 Proponents of this independent right for
78. For a discussion of the problems encountered in obtaining jurisdiction under
neglect statutes, see Wilkins, supra note 72, at 56.
79. Ellis, supra note 2, at 855.
80. For example, in the context of mental illness it has been suggested that
parents in recent years may have resorted to voluntary commitment in reaction to
the counter cultural values and lifestyles they saw their children embracing. The
parents' own visceral reactions thus motivated their decision in many instances. Id.
at 851; Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 8. In the realm of
mental retardation, societal pressures and personal feelings also interfere with parental
ability to decide upon the appropriate course of conduct.
The parent may be motivated to ask for such institutionalization for a variety of
reasons other than the best interests of the child himself, i.e., the interests of
other children in the family, mental and physical frustration, economic stress,
hostility toward the child stemming from the added pressures of caring for him,
and perceived stigma of mental retardation.
Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded - Some Critical Issues, supra note
38, at 10.
81. Wilkins, supra note 72, at 55.
82. Because the decision to perform an abortion is essentially a medical judgment
based on the particular circumstances of each case, this discussion proceeds on the
assumption that the minor is in consultation with a physician. See note 84 and accom-
panying text infra. The "independence" sought refers to independence from parental
control of the minor's abortion decision.
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minors emphasize that: "it is the minor, not the parent, who must bear
the ultimate burden either of the abortion or of raising the child or placing
it for adoption ;"83 and also that "Because the rationale of Doe and Roe
requires the participation of the physician in the decision-making, the dan-
gers of an uninformed decision by the minor are mitigated."'8 4 Analogously,
it is the child, not the parent who must bear the various burdens of insti-
tutionalization.8 5 However, the participation of the admitting physician at
the institution does -not adequately mitigate the dangers of an improper
decision.8 6 Thus it is necessary to go one step further to insure that the
best interests of the minor are protected. The court in Bartley appro-
priately identified that next step as the affording of due process protections.8 7
The end result in either case is preservation of the minor's liberty, but the
realities of the two situations dictate different procedures. Accepting the
validity of this end result, courts have recently begun to recognize the
minor's independent right to consent to or to refuse an abortion. The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals in In re Smith88 overturned a lower
court order that the minor obey her mother and submit to an abortion.
The court held that a parent having the custody of a minor daughter,
sixteen years old, may not compel the child, over the child's opposition, to
submit herself to procedures which may lead to an abortion. 9 In Coe v.
Gerstein9" a three-judge federal court, although recognizing the interests
of parents within the family unit, granted declaratory relief to an unmarried
pregnant minor who challenged a Florida statute requiring parental con-
sent to her abortion. Similar results have been reached in a number of
other cases. 91 In addition, many state legislatures have acted to preserve
83. Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Con-
sent, supra note 71, at 324.
84. Id. Doe and Roe, refer to the Supreme Court decisions on abortion, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), in which the
Court explained that the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, must
bear primary responsibility for the ultimate decision and its effectuation and must
decide that in his medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. 410
U.S. at 163-64.
85. For a discussion of these burdens see text accompanying notes 54-68.
86. See text accompanying notes 42-53 supra.
87. 402 F. Supp. at 1045-47.
88. 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972).
89. Id. at 223-24, 295 A.2d at 245. In so holding, the court quoted and implicitly
overruled the reasoning of the lower court that "the Court can certainly support
parents in doing what they think is best for the child .... We don't have the mother
refusing the medical procedure and the daughter refusing to obey her mother's orders."
Id. at 217-18, 295 A.2d at 242.
90. 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (three-judge court) (Florida statute
relating to spousal or parental consent to an abortion held unconstitutional).
91. See, e.g., Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Col. 1975); Wolfe v.
Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Washington v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d
901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) ; In re Diane, 318 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1974). Subsequent to
the completion of this Comment, the Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Missouri v. Danforth, 44 U.S.L.W. 5197 (July 1, 1976) struck down a state
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the rights of minors by allowing unmarried teenagers under eighteen years
of age to consent to their own contraceptive services, abortion and treat-
ment for veneral disease.92 Legislatures and courts have thus begun to
take the necessary steps to preserve the interests of children in appropriate
medical treatment. Procedures must now be implemented to assure proper
mental health care as well.93
Parental Tort Immunity
The doctrine of parental tort immunity94 and the practice of voluntary
admissions share a common justification - the preservation of family har-
mony by avoidance of adversarial proceedings.9 5 Ironically, they also
share the feature of operating to the child's detriment. The doctrine of
parental tort immunity, strictly adhered to, denies children a valuable
means of challenging their parents' conduct even in the extreme cases
statute requiring parental consent before an abortion can be performed on a minor.
The statute under review provided:
Section 3. No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy except:
(4) With the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the
woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the
abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the
life of the mother.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.020 (1976 Supp.) The Court stated:
[T]he State may not impose a blanket provision, such as § 3(4), requiring
the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of
an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy.. . . [T]he State
does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to termi-
nate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.
44 U.S.L.W. at 5203-04.
92. 3 FAMILY PLANNING DIGEST 7 (January 1975). Unmarried teenagers younger
than eighteen may consent for their own contraceptive services in at least twenty-
four states and the District of Columbia, and for abortion in seventeen states and the
District. Minors under eighteen may consent for veneral disease treatment in all
states but Wisconsin and Hawaii.
93. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
94. This doctrine prevents civil liability from being imposed between parent and
child for conduct which would be a tort and result in liability if it occurred between
two parties who were not in a parent-child relationship. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 122 (1971).
95. See Note, Streenz v. Streenz: The End of an Era of Parental Tort Immunity,
13 ARIZ. L. REv. 720, 727 (1971); T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 154
(1963). Other justifications for parental tort immunity include avoidance of fraud
and collusion, maintenance of parental care, discipline and control over the child,
prevention of depletion of family funds, and avoidance of the possibility of succession by
the tortfeasor to the amount recovered in damages by the injured party. Id. at 727
n.52. But "by far the most frequently cited rationale for the doctrine is that to allow
children to sue their parents would disturb domestic tranquility." Note, Parental Tort
Immunity Doctrine in Indiana, 8 IND. L. REv. 394, 405 (1974).
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where a child has been beaten or raped by a parent.96 Voluntary admis-
sions, in addition to denying children a valuable means of challenging their
parents' conduct, forces children, who are not in need of treatment, to
be institutionalized against their will and deprived of their freedom. 97
Recognizing that the family harmony rationale supported an injustice in
perpetuating parental tort immunity, the courts began to reevaluate it.9a
The result has been the abrogation of the doctrine in a number of states.99
The criticisms directed at the family harmony rationale in the context of
parental tort immunity provide useful insight into the appropriateness of
continuing its use as a justification for voluntary admissions. The family
harmony argument was first attacked for its apparent inconsistent appli-
cation. The risk of disturbing domestic tranquility, if indeed there is such
a risk, is also present in property and contract actions yet the law does
not always bar these confrontations. 00 Secondly, the circumstances of
the case may themselves indicate that there was no family harmony at
the outset; thus there is nothing to preserve. 1 1 Finally, the most per-
suasive argument is that the denial of a remedy for the child may very
well result in the precise evil sought to be avoided. "If a child is injured
and angry enough to sue his parent, denying the child a legal remedy will
neither soothe the child nor promote harmony in the family."' 0 2
Analyzing the family harmony rationale in the context of "voluntary"
admissions, the same inconsistency, dubiousness and likelihood of reverse
effect is apparent. The courts have involved themselves in a number of
situations where the interests of parent and child conflict.10 3 It is dis-
ingenous to suggest that allowing a child to contest his need for institu-
tionalization will more severely affect family harmony than these other
proceedings. The chances that family harmony never really existed are
96. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (held that daughter
could not sue her father for damages arising out of a rape) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey,
111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (held that a minor child could not sue her step-
mother or father for damages resulting from brutal punishment inflicted by the step-
mother with the father's consent).
97. For a discussion of reasons for commitment other than the child's need for
treatment, see text accompanying notes 33-41 supra.
98. See Comment, IntraFamily Tort Liability - A Situation of Confused Dis-
parity, 5 CuMEM. SAM. L. Rxv. 273, 296 n.167 (1974-75).
99. Note, Streenz v. Streens: The End of an Era of Parental Tort Immunity,
supra note 95, at 722.
100. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971);
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 9
(Alas. 1967).
101. See Note, Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine in Indiana, supra note 95, at 405.
102. Note, Streenz v. Streenz: The End of an Era of Parental Tort Immunity,
supra note 95, at 728.
103. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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even greater in this context than in a tort case. "Often the problems which
lead parents to seek hospitalization of their child can be traced to family
difficulties and not just the 'illness' of an individual child.' x0 4 Denying
the child a right to be heard in commitment proceedings will most probably
result in the child's institutionalization, but there is unlikely to be any
lasting peace in the family. "Judicial nonintervention supports the integrity
of the family unit only in the sense that it allows the parents in a dysfunc-
tional family to deny the existence of real family problems by 'blaming'
them on the illness of one of their children."'01 5 Thus, rather than achieving
any sort of meaningful family harmony, "voluntary" admission procedures
merely allow the family to turn its back on the problem. The law should
not seek to encourage such artificial domestic tranquility. Preservation of
family harmony is as inappropriate a justification for "voluntary" admis-
sion as it is for the parental tort immunity doctrine, for the simple reason
that family harmony is unlikely to be preserved or achieved by either
practice. However, encouraging domestic tranquility is a very worthy
objective and should not be abandoned because the means sought were
ineffectual. In fact, this objective has been furthered by the Bartley court
in that the procedures it outlined'016 contribute substantially to family
understanding and harmony in addition to protecting the interests of the
child. 0 7
104. Ellis, supra note 2, at 859 citing T. LIDZ, S. FLECK & A. CORNELLISON,
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY (1965).
105. Id. at 854-55.
106. 402 F. Supp. at 1048-54.
107. Dr. Eli Charles Messinger points out several ways in which the family would
benefit from the provision of due process protections for the child. All parties would
have an opportunity to air their differences in an open and forthright manner.
Rather than masking family disputes and difficulties, they would be recognized so
they could be dealt with more constructively. Emphasis would be placed on develop-
ing a comprehensive picture of the events that have led parents to seek institution-
alization of the juvenile. This effort at fact finding in itself would have a thera-
peutic effect on the child and family; for some it would be the first time that they
will have been exposed to all sides of the story.
Affidavit of Dr. Eli Charles Messinger, supra note 1, at 14. In addition, more emphasis
would be placed on alternatives to hospitalization.
Mental health professionals would be under self-imposed pressure to find such
alternatives rather than have to defend questionable hospitalization recommenda-
tions. The juvenile's attorney would also have an opportunity to add his or her
resources and talents to the search. In some cases, the necessity for a hearing would
be avoided because satisfactory alternatives to hospitalization would have been
secured. Rather than discouraging people from seeking treatment for juveniles,
services would be provided that were better fitted to the child's and family's needs.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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Child Abuse and Neglect
Probably the most obvious examples of conflicts of interest between
parent and child are cases of child abuse' 08 and neglect.' 0 9 In these
areas the state readily intervenes on behalf of the child." 0 The abuse"'
problem is relevant to the "voluntary" admissions issue for several reasons.
It is a stark reminder that parents on some occasions do not act in the
best interests of their children." 2 In addition, the state's resolution of the
parent-child conflict reflected by such abuse provides a basis for evaluating
the means chosen by the court in Bartley for resolving the conflict asso-
ciated with "voluntary" admissions. 113
When abuse is detected, 114 the state initiates a judicial proceeding" 15
to resolve the conflict between the rights of the parents 16 and the rights of
108. Child abuse has historically been defined as any non-accidental injury in-
flicted on the child by the parent. Over the years, various statutory refinements have
been made. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to
Child Abuse, 12 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 103, 106 (1974).
109. Statutes defining neglect encompass a variety of situations including lack of
parental care, failure to provide for a child's needs, unfit environment, etc. See S.
KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 57-58 (1971). Some states have recently begun to
include neglect in their definition of child abuse. See Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative
to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, supra note 108, at 106-08.
110. See V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUsE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's
(rev. ed. 1974).
111. For the purpose of the Child Abuse and Neglect section of this Comment, the
term "abuse" will be used to refer to both classes of cases.
112. Judge Huyett commented on this fact in his opinion in Bartley. See note
23 supra.
113. Because the effectiveness of state intervention in the abuse area has recently
been subjected to a great deal of criticism, see, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of "Neglected" Children, A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV.
985 (1975); Clements, Child Abuse: The Problem of Definition, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV.
729 (1974-75) ; Duncan, Recognition and Protection of the Family's Interests in
Child Abuse Proceedings, 13 FAM. L.J. 83 (1973-74), both present procedures and
suggestions for revision will be considered.
114. Mandatory reporting statutes have been enacted in all states to facilitate the
bringing of information concerning alleged cruelty to the state's attention. See Fraser,
A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, supra
note 108, at 108-16, which delineates who is required to report suspected cases of child
abuse pursuant to the various state statutes. For example, in all states physicians are
required to report suspected cases of child abuse, in a majority of states the require-
ment is extended to nurses, and in some states social workers, teachers, police officers
or any other person who has reasonable cause to suspect that abuse has occurred
are included within the statutory mandate. The state reporting laws are compiled in
V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's (rev. ed. 1974).
For a discussion of possible negative ramifications of reporting statutes, see Kleinfeld,
Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, Part II, 4 FAM. L.Q.
410, 431-32 (1970-71).
115. The proceedings, however, are conducted loosely and without minimum due
process standards. See generally Note, Dependent-Neglect Proceedings: A Case for
Procedural Due Process, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 651 (1971).
116. Parental rights applicable to this discussion include the right to raise a family
and direct its upbringing. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince
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the child."17 The state, as complainant, must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence 18 that the parents have subjected the child to abuse. Once
this is established, there are a number of remedies from which the court
may choose."x9 For example, the court may order the removal of the
child from the custody of his parents, 120 require the parents to accept
compulsory supervisory services,121 or order the child placed in a day
care program. 122 There is unlimited potential for judicial creativity in
shaping a remedy designed to promote the best interests of the child;
however, restrictions on court time frequently dictate that it forego a
creative role in the handling of children. 23 In essence, the state is inter-
jecting third party assistance in cases where parents have failed to meet
the minimum standards of acceptable parental behavior.' 24 The courts
are intent upon protecting the best interests of the child, because it is the
child who suffers by virtue of the parental inadequacy. There is a place
for this same concern in the realm of admissions to mental hospitals. The
fact that inappropriate parental conduct in this context may be inadvertent
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
117. The child's rights include the right to life, adequate care, and freedom from
cruel or unusual punishment. See V. DEFRANCIS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
8-10 (1971). In addition, it has been suggested that the right of parents to bring up
children may imply a correlative right of children to be raised by their parents. See
Weiss, The Emerging Rights of Minors, 4 U. ToL. L. REv. 25, 28-29 (1972).
118. Some jurisdictions require the state to prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., In re Overton, 316 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974) ; Hendrickson
v. Binkley, 316 N.E.2d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
119. See Katz, supra note 109, at 81.
120. See Carpenter, The Parent-Child Dilemma in the Courts, 30 OHIO ST. L.J.
292 (1969).
121. See generally Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (Court upheld New
York state's requirement that welfare mother permit a home visit by welfare worker) ;
Dembitz, Welfare Home Visits: Child Versus Parent, 57 A.B.A.J. 871 (1971).
122. See 3 S. WHITE, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR YOUNG CHILDREN: REVIEW AND
REcOMMENDATIONS 31-43 (1973); Pavenstedt, An Intervention Program for Infants
from High Risk Homes, 63 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 393 (1973).
123. Note, Neglected Children and Their Parents in Indiana, 7 IND. L. REV. 1049,
1051 (1974).
124. Courts are careful in this regard not to impose arbitrary notions of proper
parenting. See, e.g., State v. McMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d 567, 572-73 (1971),
in which the court stated:
[W]e do not believe the legislature contemplated that parental rights could be
terminated because the natural parents are unable to furnish surroundings which
could enable the child to grow up as we would desire all children to do. ...
The legislature had in mind conduct substantially departing from the norm. ...
Accord, In re Raya, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (Ct. App. 1967).
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rather than intentional should not be significant. 125 The child's interests are
equally in need of protection where institutionalization is contemplated
as where abuse or neglect is inflicted. 126 The procedures outlined in Bartley
to insure such protection constitute a significantly lesser intrusion into
family affairs than that required in abuse cases. 12  The limited nature and
purpose of state intervention imposed by the Bartley decision is in line
with the revisions sought by critics of the present child abuse jurisdiction
of the courts. One of the most frequent complaints concerns the lack of
due process requirements.128  Another is the broad and vague language
of the statutes which seem to allow virtually unlimited intervention. 29
In addition, the remedy of removing the child from the family has been
sharply criticized as an ineffectual way of resolving the problem.
It is well recognized by psychiatrists that so far as the child's
emotions are concerned, interference with [parental] tie [s], whether to
a 'fit' or 'unfit' psychological parent is extremely painful. Continuity
of relationships is extremely important to children. Removing a child
from his family may cause serious psychological damage - damage
more serious than the harm intervention is supposed to prevent. 30
On the contrary, in the judicial proceedings advocated in the context of
institutionalization, the court-enforced protections avert unnecessary sepa-
rations of the child from his family while encouraging attempts to find more
appropriate, less drastic solutions.
Thus, in taking jurisdiction of neglect and child abuse cases, the courts
very definitely and justifiably have involved themselves in family affairs.
This involvement can and should be extended to encompass admission of
children to mental institutions. Affording due process protections to
children will prevent needless commitments with their attendant family dis-
ruptions. Such limited intervention is well within the bounds of proper
state involvement even when judged by the standards of the critics of child
abuse and neglect jurisdiction.
125. As Judge Fuld stated in his dissenting opinion in In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y.
80, 86, 127 N.E.2d 820, 824 (1955) : "To the boy and his future, it makes no difference
that it may be ignorance rather than viciousness that will perpetuate his unfortunate
condition." (That case concerned a proceeding to transfer custody of a fourteen year
old boy from his parents to Commissioner of Social Welfare for purposes of consenting
to performance of medical services which his parents had refused).
126. For a discussion of the appalling conditions and treatment likely to be en-
countered by people in mental institutions see Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-
Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447 (1973).
127. What is involved in a commitment hearing is not an after-the-fact review of
parental conduct but rather an evaluation of the child's mental state.
128. See, e.g., Note, Dependent-Neglect Proceedings: A Case for Procedural Due
Process, supra note 115; Duncan, Recognition and Protection of the Family's Interests
in Child Abuse Proceedings, supra note 113, at 809.
129. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children, A Search for
Realistic Standards, supra note 113, at 1000.
130. Id. at 993-94 (footnotes omitted). But see Kleinfeld, Balance of Power
Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, Part II, supra note 114, at 432-33.
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Ungovernability
The parent-child conflict, ignored in the realm of "voluntary" admis-
sions, is virtually conceded when parents seek to have their child adjudged
ungovernable.13 ' Parents who consider themselves unable to govern their
child's behavior may invoke the jurisdiction of juvenile and family courts
over youths who have engaged in non-criminal behavior.18 2 The court
then has the authority to place the child in a "reform" or "training" school,
if in fact such action is deemed necessary. 133 Parents who believe their
children are beyond control cannot "volunteer" them to training schools. 84
At one time, however, courts were unwilling to recognize the parent-
child conflict and sanctioned procedures for admitting a child to reform
school which closely parallel those used today for "voluntary" admissions
to mental hospitals. An example of this judicial attitude is evidenced in
the case of Rule v. Geddes.135 The court in that case upheld the commit-
ment of a fifteen year old girl to reform school for incorrigibility despite
the fact that she had been committed upon the application of her father
without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The court stated:
The petitioner was a minor .... Her father, as her natural guardian,
had the legal right to regulate her conduct, to restrain her liberty
within all reasonable bounds, and to direct her training and education.
She was not entitled to general freedom of action, but was under his
tutelage. He had the legal right to confine her within certain limits,
to select her associates, and to commit her to the restraint of an
institution for training and education during her minority without
her consent. Her reasonable detention during such period for purposes
of education would not be imprisonment, but the lawful restraint
implied in the exercise of recognized parental authority ...
... The child herself, having no right to control her own action
or to select her own course of life, had no legal right to be heard in
these proceedings. 136
131. Where the parent is the complainant against an allegedly disobedient child,
the conflict of interests is apparent and has been recognized as such by the courts.
See, e.g., Marsden v. Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 564, 227 N.E.2d 1 (1967) (child must
be provided with separate counsel) ; In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1953) (mother cannot control daughter's legal representation or waive doctor-patient
privilege for her in "beyond control" proceedings).
132. Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383
(1974). Offenses include such things as staying out late, disobeying parents, running
away, and truancy. This jurisdiction is commonly referred to as "ungovernability" or
"beyond control" or "in-need-of-supervision" jurisdiction. Unrelated individuals, police,
and various institutions also initiate ungovernability proceedings.
133. See Klapmuts, Children's Rights: The Legal Rights of Minors in Conflict
with Law or Social Custom, 4 CRIME & DELIN. LIT. 449 (1972).
134. The Supreme Court has established stringent due process procedures for the
incarceration of children, whether for criminal behavior or for mere disobedience or
incorrigibility. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (details the
development of due process protections in juvenile courts).
135. 23 App. D.C. 31 (Ct. App. 1904).
136. Id. at 49-50.
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The analogue between reform schools and mental hospitals did not
end when the former underwent the judicially enforced change in admis-
sions procedures. In the eyes of many parents who can no longer control
their child's behavior, a reform school and a mental hospital may appear
fungible. 137 If they are reluctant to refer the child to local authorities
under the "beyond control" statutes138 (and thereby subject the child and
themselves to juvenile court proceedings), they are likely to resort to
"voluntary" placement of the child in a mental hospital. 39 Both institu-
tions are designed to perform treatment, not punishment. However, the
facilities of both are often dangerous and deteriorated.140 And, the child,
in either situation, must suffer a grievous loss of liberty. 14 1
In light of these similarities, it seems incongruous to ignore the
conflict of interests and potential for incarceration in voluntary admissions
and deny due process protection to the child. The court in Bartley alluded
to this when it quoted the following statement of the Tenth Circuit in
Heryford v. Parker :142
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled 'civil' or 'criminal'
or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delin-
quency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration - whether
for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile
for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble minded or
mental incompetent - which commands observance of the constitu-
tional safeguards of due process.
Because the parent-child conflict and the threat of involuntary incarceration
are just as real for a child facing institutionalization as they are for a child
137. This is most likely to occur in situations where the parents do not have
the requisite wealth to seek private treatment and are thus dependent upon public
institutions.
138. See, e.g., Mo. CTS. & Juo. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1974) (child in need
of supervision).
139. This occurrence is reflected in a number of the reasons for plaintiffs' com-
mitments cited by the court in Bartley, e.g., difficulties in relating to mother, poor
family situations, management problem to parents and community, running away,
truance, school phobia, and drug overdose. 402 F. Supp. at 1044.
140. See Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, supra note 131,
at 1047 (discussing detention centers for ungovernable youths) ; Ferleger, Loosing
the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, supra note 126 (dis-
cussing conditions in mental hospitals).
141. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1966). "The boy is committed to an in-
stitution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional
consequence and of limited practical meaning that the institution to which he is com-
mitted is called an industrial school."
142. 402 F. Supp. at 1046, quoting from Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396
(10th Cir. 1968). Heryford was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a mother as
natural guardian on behalf of her mentally deficient son who had been committed to
a state training school for the feeble-minded and epileptic. The court held that a denial
of due process occurred where a mentally deficient person was not afforded legal counsel
at the hearing which resulted in his involuntary commitment to a state institution.
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charged with ungovernability, the same procedural protections should apply.
The court in Bartley thus appropriately remedied the existing disparity.143
THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PARENT AND STATE
While the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of parental authority
on a number of occasions, 44 it has in the past concentrated on the conflict
between the authority of the parent and the power of the state, 145 clearly a
different issue than the parent-child conflict presented by Bartley. The
Court's position, developed in this context of parent versus state was aptly
summarized in Stanley v. Illinois :146
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been
deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, . . . "basic civil rights of
man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, . . . and "[r]ights far more precious
than property rights," May v. Anderson. . . . It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Prince v. Massa-
chusetts. .. . The integrity of the family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v.
Nebraska, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, . . . and the Ninth Amendment,
Griswold v. Connecticut....
143. It is important to note that affording due process is not a panacea in and of
itself. Despite the procedural protection guaranteed in ungovernability proceedings, the
system is still subjected to a great deal of abuse and the parent-child conflict is not
always appropriately resolved. See Sidman, The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law:
Law and Order in the Home, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33 (1972). Note, Ungovernability: The
Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, supra note 132.
144. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
145. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), for example, a conflict existed
between a state prohibition of the teaching of any language other than English in
the first eight grades of school and the parental desire to have their children learn
German. The Court found in favor of the parents, holding the applicable state statute
to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), the conflict involved a state requirement that children between the
ages of eight and sixteen attend public school and the desire on the part of some
parents to send their children to private schools. Again the Court preserved the
authority of parents to direct their child's education as opposed to allowing the state
to do so. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court limited parental
authority somewhat by convicting the guardian of a nine year old child for violating
state labor laws by furnishing the child with magazines knowing that the child would
sell them unlawfully. The Court noted that the family is not totally beyond the control
of the state and that the state may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance and regulating or prohibiting the child's labor. 321 U.S. at 166.
146. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted) (unwed father entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children are taken from him upon
mother's death).
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Because the Court assumed the parents' interest and the child's interests
were compatible, the line of authority reflected in the above statement is
only relevant to, not determinative of, the issue at hand. The Court ac-
knowledged this fact in Wisconsin v. Yoder 14 7 where, in reviewing the
conviction of Old Order Amishmen for violation of Wisconsin's compul-
sory school attendance law, it held that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments prevent the state from compelling the Amish to send their children
to formal high school until age sixteen. The Court stated: "Our holding
in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests
of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding
in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish
parents are preventing their minor children from attending high school
despite their expressed desires to the contrary."' 48 Lower courts have
also evinced an awareness of the differences between the two issues. Re-
ferring to the Pierce, Meyer, Prince line of authority, one court stated:
[T] hose cases which have considered parental control of children
have involved conflicts between parents and the state wherein the
courts have considered intrusions by the state into the area of parental
values. . . .Cases which have upheld parental control have not in-
volved a situation where the parent and child differ and the state
is imposing the parents' views on the minor. 149
Certainly, the authority of parents as the persons best suited and
primarily responsible for the raising of their children 50 is not herein
disputed. What is emphasized is that parental authority is not unlimited
147. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
148. Id. at 231. Justice Douglas in dissent, however, refused to assume an identity
of interest between parent and child, and urged resolution of the parent-child conflict.
He noted, "[W]e have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and State
with little regard for the views of the child." Id. at 243. Douglas argued that on the
important and vital matter of education, the child was entitled to be heard. "If he
[the child] is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if
his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed." Id. at 245-46.
149. Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 956 (D. Col. 1975) (child's right to
have an abortion may not be conditioned upon parental approval). Another court stated:
[T]he cases cited by defendants and intervenors involving rights of parents uni-
formly concern situations where the parents' claimed rights are compatible with
the minor's, not adverse. Such cases are of no assistance. Of course parents have
rights in proper instances, to act in their children's interests. What is claimed
here is something altogether different. But even if it should be found that parents
may have rights that are separate from the child's, we would find that in the
present area the individual rights of the minor outweigh the rights of the parents,
and must be protected.
Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 856-57 (D. Mass. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 96 S.
Ct. 390 (1976) (child's right to an abortion without parental consent).
150. See Bazelon, Whose Needy Children?, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237, 246 (1975):
[T]he family is the most effective child-developing agent around, when it wants to
be and can be. Out of the plethora of studies of day care and early intervention,
one thing stands out: a child needs most a family - it is there that he finds his
roots and his education.
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and at some point in time must be balanced against other interests. 51
In the context of "voluntary" admissions, the balance must be struck
between the interests of the parent and those of the child; therefore the
cases upholding the traditional authority of parents against the encroach-
ments of the state are not controlling. 152 The conflict is clearly intra-family
and must be resolved as such.
CONCLUSION
Children have a constitutionally protected interest in being free from
wrongful and unwarranted deprivations of liberty. Unnecessary confine-
ment and detention in a mental institution is a deprivation of liberty.
Thus a child facing institutionalization must be afforded the procedural
protection guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, the application of due process, to be meaningful in this
context, must be accompanied by an assurance that parents will not be
allowed to waive the constitutional rights of the child. The need for this
assurance derives from the fact that the interests of parents and children
in the matter of institutionalization are not necessarily the same. In other
areas where parent and child interests conflict, the courts and legislatures
have provided means of reconciliation. The court in Bartley properly
concluded that the application of due process would provide the necessary
balance between the rights of parents and children in the particular area of
conflict under review. This decision in no way denigrates the importance
of the family; rather it encourages families to settle their problems in an
open and equitable fashion. The court's respect for the family is evidenced
in its statement that:
This finding does not mean that when considering whether or not to
institutionalize a child, the state should ignore the opinions and
observations of the child's parents. Rather the committing authorities
should listen carefully to parents who live with and observe the child
on a daily basis for they very likely have invaluable information con-
cerning their child.153
In light of the seriousness and potential danger of juvenile institutionaliza-
tion in mental hospitals, due process of law, as a check on unbridled
parental discretion, is essential and will ultimately inure to the benefit of
both parent and child.
151. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
152. The primary state interest here is in ensuring the appropriateness of state
hospital confinement.
153. 402 F. Supp. at 1048 n.12.
